Mike Burgess, the Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), recently issued a dire and unprecedented admonition in regard to national security. He announced that ASIO had prevented 24 significant espionage attempts in the last three years. This figure already exceeds the total disruptions for the previous eight years combined. It vividly illustrates the disturbing escalation of foreign interference efforts directed at Australia.
During a recent press event around that report release, Mr. Burgess was adamant that determining the cost of espionage is a “very difficult” thing to do. He cautioned that the estimates could be “conservatively underestimating” real financial impact. He’s confident this impact will grow to $12.5 billion per year and beyond. The report was largely produced in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Criminology. It serves the important purpose of being a wakeup call to the growing sophistication and frequency of foreign espionage.
In these comments, Mr. Burgess notably singled out countries including China, Russia, and Iran as the primary offenders behind these spying efforts. He expressed concern that Australians would be “shocked” to learn about the extent of foreign espionage tactics being employed against them.
Espionage Tactics and Risks
The report was an alarming look at the tactics and disinformation spread by foreign intelligence services. These tactics have involved directly targeting defense employees and using secretive surveillance devices. Mr. Burgess disclosed that defense personnel have endured clandestine hotel room searches while traveling. Surprisingly, they’ve faced the unwanted attention of foreign intelligence officers disguised as everyday people when overseas.
He recounted a truly appalling episode with an overseas delegation. By doing so, they pilfered an alleged “rare and valuable variety of fruit tree” from one of Australia’s most sensitive – and important – horticultural facilities. These actions are indicative of the extent to which foreign entities are willing to go in order to pillage Australian resources and secrets.
“Foreign intelligence services are proactive, creative and opportunistic in their targeting of current and former defence employees: relentless cyber espionage, in-person targeting and technical collection,” Mr. Burgess stated, reinforcing the need for heightened awareness among those working in sensitive sectors.
As a hopeful sign, Mr. Burgess noted a small drop in reported incidents since he first sounded the alarm two years ago. That’s pretty incredible, considering how shocking and scary these tactics are. He warned that a significant number of defence employees still do not understand the dangers posed by espionage.
Underestimating the Threat
Mr. Burgess lambasted the annoying and dangerous attitude that exists among the local government with respect to the threat of espionage. He remembered times when foreign officials would refuse to believe that senior intelligence officials were interested in their operation.
“Most recently, a trade official told ASIO there’s no way the Chinese intelligence services would have any interest in his organisation’s people and premises in China,” he said, illustrating a troubling disconnect between perception and reality.
He followed that up with a rhetorical ontological statement of frustration when he said, “I’ve lost count of the times that senior officials and executives have quietly downplayed the impact of spying. This cavalier approach puts sensitive information at risk in addition to putting national security in jeopardy.
The ASIO director warned those in sensitive or critical industries to “think before you post.” Believe me, I get it—everyone is trying to brand themselves. Allegedly having a security clearance or being involved on a very classified project in social media is not only foolish. It’s a dangerous call to action for foreign intelligence services to pay attention.
Protecting Sensitive Information
Almost 400 public servants publicly renounced their participation in the AUKUS agreement on social media. Mr. Burgess pointed out that 7,000-plus Australian public servants list their jobs in the defense sector on social media networking sites. This whipsawiness creates a massive open door that foreign intelligence services could be salivating over.
Sadly, a small number fall under their spell and are recruited to assist in intelligence gathering for an enemy nation. He made it clear how critical it is for us to understand all these threats.
He implored the audience to remain ever watchful. He touched on the need for those who engage in our national security to understand the hazards that accompany their work. Surely these guys, of all guys, should know the danger and see the damage coming?
