A recent report from the US Coast Guard found that safety practices within OceanGate, the company behind Titan submersible disaster, exhibited a grossly negligent disregard for safety. It is this negligence that resulted in the catastrophic implosion that killed five people, including Stockton Rush, the company’s chief executive. On June 18, 2023 a tragic event occurred on an exploratory expedition. The crew and scientific team traveled to the deep North Atlantic to re-discover the wreck of the Titanic.
These findings disclose many of the circumstances that resulted in this preventable disaster. Arguably a toxic workplace culture and systemic failures in safety protocols were the biggest contributors. Stockton Rush’s hubris allegedly led to the misjudgments of OceanGate’s employees, contractors, and mission specialists. The report describes a perfect storm of risks that led to the destruction of the submersible. These risks were entirely avoidable with a strong commitment to complying with established safety practices.
The Tragic Incident
As our expedition day commenced, the Titan submersible was making its exciting descent to the Titanic wreck site. It ran into a serious problem, suffering a “Loss of Structural Integrity.” Warning signs had been indicating potential damage to the vessel’s hull at least a year prior to the incident. Unfortunately, OceanGate, in its pursuit of innovation, chose to disregard these important red flags. The most dramatic of all the US Coast Guard’s finds this year! A remotely operated vehicle found the Titan’s wreckage, which lies fewer than 500 meters away from where her Titanic sank, four kilometers down under the ocean surface.
Just days after the submersible went missing, officials pronounced Stockton Rush, Shahzada Dawood, Suleman Dawood, Hamish Harding, and Paul-Henri Nargeolet dead. As the search efforts ramped up, tragedy struck almost immediately. The report indicates that had OceanGate taken earlier warnings seriously, many of the risks contributing to the implosion could have been avoided.
Failure in Safety Protocols
The US Coast Guard’s detailed 300-page report identifies over 175 deficiencies in OceanGate’s overall methods for ensuring safety. Yet it pointedly chastised the company for failing to engage independent safety experts and for skipping the usual testing and safety procedures.
Instead, decisions were made almost autocratically by Rush, often crushing the concerns of the most knowledgeable public servants and contractors. According to the report:
“Decisions were made unilaterally at the top, with Mr. Rush often bypassing established protocols and ignoring the concerns of other experienced OceanGate employees and contractors.”
The report points to a toxic culture within OceanGate, where management retaliated against those who raised compliance-related concerns:
“OceanGate’s management actively retaliated against employees who raised legitimate compliance related concerns.”
Structural Integrity Compromised
Those attempts at neglecting safety standards were exacerbated by the financial constraints from OceanGate. Cost-cutting measures resulted in the experimental submersible being left outside during brutal Canadian winters, almost certainly compromising its hull.
According to US DOT’s report, signs of trouble had been clear for a long time leading up to the disaster. If OceanGate had adhered to more rigorous testing protocols and taken warnings seriously, it is probable that many risks could have been avoided:
“Had OceanGate taken the warnings more seriously, involved independent safety experts, or adhered to more rigorous testing and safety protocols, many of the risks that contributed to the eventual implosion could have been mitigated or avoided entirely.”
The probe found a long, disturbing history of false claims about safety practices in OceanGate’s business.
“The analysis reveals a disturbing pattern of misrepresentation and reckless disregard for safety in OceanGate’s operation of the TITAN submersible,” the report claims.
