The recent assassination of former President Donald Trump during a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, raises grave concerns. It has shown large operational failures with the United States Secret Service. In a detailed report, Secret Service Deputy Director Matt Quinn announced that despite these failures, no agents would face termination. Instead, six employees have been put on leave, prompting doubts regarding the agency’s capacity to protect high-profile people.
On July 13, 2024 Escaped Suicide Watch/20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks/No End to Extended Mind Control opened fire in an attempted mass shooting. The sniper guarding the Secret Service detail quickly neutralized him. Investigations found several failures in security procedures, from lack of response to credible threats to failures in communication between the teams involved. Unfortunately, these failures have led to a reassessment of not only the agency’s practices but of personnel management within the agency.
Suspensions and Consequences
In testimony before Congress, Matt Quinn acknowledged that six Secret Service agents were issued suspensions following the incident. The site agent ultimately charged with Trump’s security detail only got a one-day suspension for not following procedures. Another agent, who’d been working Trump’s detail on that rally, got a stiffer punishment. While they were suspended for only 42 days, they have been reassigned away from their job ever since.
Further, as of December 20, 2024, the Counter Sniper Team Leader is subject to restrictive duty. These disciplinary actions come in the wake of heightened scrutiny regarding the Secret Service’s operational integrity and its commitment to protecting public figures.
“It was a complete breakdown of security at every level — fuelled by bureaucratic indifference, a lack of clear protocols, and a shocking refusal to act on clear threats.” – Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee report (via Republican Senator Rand Paul)
The effects of the assassination hustle didn’t stop with her operation, though, as large aftershocks propelled outright leadership changes within the agency. Kimberly Cheatle, who was appointed to lead the Secret Service, resigned less than a month after the incident. She was accused of giving “false” and contradictory (she) testimony about the events leading up to the shooting. Cheatle has denied these allegations, which she described as “patently false.”
Former Acting Director Ronald Rowe announced his retirement in February under the shadow of accusations of much of the same misconduct during his testimony. This leadership upheaval illustrates the broader fallout from the failure in security that let Crooks get so close to making an assassination attempt.
Miscommunication and Operational Failures
The investigation into that assassination attempt found terrifying levels of miscommunication between agents. A security room operator said they had heard nothing regarding criminals being spotted on the roof. This break-down of communication preceded the shooting itself.
“I was just waiting to hear an update … if they were able to find the person.” – The Security Room Agent
The agent expressed bewilderment at the poor coordination between local law enforcement and the Secret Service. This critical concern came to play in the moments just before the shooting. They listened in as local police dealt with a vague but menacing threat. The agent did not recall any definitive communication regarding Crooks being on the roof.
“I don’t explicitly remember a point in time where I was like, ‘Oh, there’s definitely another command post’.” – The Security Room Agent
According to the report, the Hercules 1 counter sniper team had a clear line of sight on Crooks. Their charge was such that it necessitated their attention being diverted from the subject matter at hand. That’s why the Hercules 2 counter sniper team made sure to keep a sharp eye on the roof of the AGR building. This was the very place where Crooks eventually shot at Trump.
“When asked if the [Secret Service] Counter Sniper Advance Lead gave explicit instructions to local counter snipers regarding a plan to cover the roof of the AGR building, [Mr Rowe] responded that it was his understanding the locals ‘had a plan’.” – The report (referring to Former Acting Director Ronald Rowe)
Taken together, these revelations indicate a systemic problem within the Secret Service’s threat assessment and response protocols.
The Aftermath and Moving Forward
As investigations continue, many are calling for comprehensive reforms within the Secret Service to prevent such failures in the future. The agency’s success in fulfilling its protective mission—including of very high-profile individuals—is existential, and leadership now faces enormous pressure to regain public trust.
In view of these incidents and new revelations, former agents and experts have raised alarm about the agency’s operational readiness and accountability. The Senate’s year long investigation confirms the need for established protocols. It is imperative that these protocols are developed and adhered to in order to mitigate the dangers of such high-profile gatherings.
“Like, it wasn’t like he rushed around or did anything.” – The Security Room Agent
The quote from the agents directly involved in the incident highlights a disturbing indifference to an immediate threat. This sentiment rings true with those critics, who contend that bureaucratic inertia needs to be overcome to make security enhancements more effective.
